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Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (JF 2009) empirically find that public firms have doubled their cash reservoirs due to both more volatile cash flows and larger risky R&D expenditures in recent decades. This substantial increase in precautionary cash-to-assets intensity is primarily due to an increase in cash flow volatility and idiosyncratic risk (Keynes, 1936; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, JF 1999; Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, JF 2001; Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, JF 2004; Acharya, Almeida, and Campello, JFI 2006; Riddick and Whited, JF 2009). Share issuance has become a dominant source of external finance for firms with precautionary motives due to large risky R&D cash outlays and volatile cash flows (McLean, JFE 2011).

The agency conflict of interest between corporate incumbents and shareholders affects the typical firm's propensity to stockpile cash reserves (Jensen and Meckling, AER 1976; Jensen, AER 1986; Stulz, JFE 1990; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, JFE 1991; Harford, JF 1999; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, JF 2006). This agency theory predicts that corporate incumbents prefer to stockpile free cash flows for better private benefits of control rather than disgorge cash to outside shareholders. Shareholders assign a lower marginal value to an additional dollar of cash when agency problems are likely to be more severe (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, JFE 2007). Cross-country evidence further lends credence to the agency prediction that weaker shareholder rights correlate with larger cash stockpiles (Dittmar, Marhrt-Smith, and Servaes, JFQA 2003). Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (JFE 2008) find evidence in support of the alternative spending hypothesis that corporate incumbents often spend cash quickly on M&A and capital overinvestments. Firms with weaker managerial governance and lower incumbent stock ownership also tend to repurchase stock rather than increase dividend payout. This tendency reflects a lack of firm commitment to regular and smooth dividend payout in the future (Fama and French, JFE 2001, JFE 2004; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, JFE 2004; Skinner, JFE 2008; Leary and Michaely, RFS 2011; Michaely and Roberts, RFS 2011). Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell's (JFE 2008) empirical analysis serves as an ingenious resurrection of the agency explanation for corporate cash management. Gao, Harford, and Li (JFE 2013) find that relative to public firms, private firms face less severe agency conflict, lower leverage, and better investment efficiency (in terms of greater ROA and R&D intensity). This agency difference helps explain why on average private firms retain about half as much cash as public firms do. Also, private firms adjust their cash ratios toward the target ratios faster than public firms do.

Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (JF 2014) suggest that cash reserves allow a firm to mitigate the adverse effects of debt refinancing risk. Because debt exerts a disciplinary effect on the agency costs of large cash stockpiles (Jensen, AER 1986; Stulz, JFE 1990; Harford, JF 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, JFE 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, JFE 2008), it is important for the econometrician to account for the potential endogeneity of both corporate cash retention and debt maturity. The econometrician applies a simultaneous-equations framework with a host of control variables to find that a decrease in debt maturity leads the firm to retain more cash to counteract potential refinancing risk.

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The financial services industry needs fewer banks worldwide.

As long as banks have existed in human history, their managers have realized how not all depositors demand their money back at once in normal times. These banks do not have to keep cash on hand for every deposit. Instead, these banks can use the money to make loans for better macro credit expansion. In a fundamental way, banks provide funds for private capital investments and so earn net interest income for themselves. The fractional reserves that banks hold against their deposits have another effect. In practice, these fractional reserves make banks unstable financial institutions. The human history of monetary capitalism reflects relentless economic enrichment with the scars of both frequent bank runs and financial crises.

Technological advances settle and process almost all payments through the digital transmission mechanism. Most banks are far bigger. The total assets of the biggest 1,000 banks worldwide are worth at least $128 trillion in 2020-2022. This valuation dwarfs the annual global GDP of about $85 trillion.

However, a world without banks is visible on the horizon. Their role is under threat from new technology and even the public sector. Tech giants such as Meta, Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, PayPal, Alibaba, and Tencent etc develop quicker and easier online payment systems that can pull transactions out of the banking system. Digital payments may bring about the end of cash. Both financial regulation and monetary policy have traditionally operated through banks. If this usual monetary transmission mechanism is lost, central bank regulators may have to create digital money instead.

In our modern capitalist society, we cannot explain most economic actions with no account of money. Almost all economic propositions are practically relative to the modus operandi of a given monetary system. Nonetheless, it is possible for us to see a future where most banks play a much smaller role. Central banks can come up with digital money, and tech firms and capital markets settle and process many deposits and financial transactions via online payment platforms.

With the alchemy of global finance, banks turn idle deposits into economic engines for capital investments worldwide. In each of the OECD countries, only 3 to 4 banks dominate as national champions. Both state-driven digital currencies and private payment platforms can benefit from pervasive network effects. The power tends to concentrate in only 1 to 2 state institutions (i.e. the central bank and fiscal treasury). The state can further use digital money for better social control. From time to time, cash is not traceable, but digital money leaves a trail. The state can try to program exclusively digital money to restrict its use. In this positive light, the state can make fiscal stimulus programs more effective to target specific groups. With macro credit provision, the state plays a crucial role for better social control. On the other hand, the current fintech trend may lead to the concentration of power in tech titans and governments. A world without banks may sound like a dream. This dream may turn out to be more like a nightmare.

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Temporary market undervaluation often induces corporate incumbents to initiate a share repurchase program to boost the firm's stock price (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, JF 1990; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, JF 1995; Nohel and Tarhan, JFE 1998; Rau and Vermaelen, JFE 1998; Peyer and Vermaelen, RFS 2009; Dittmar and Field, JFE 2015). Firms often tend to engage in deliberate net income inflation in the pre-IPO or pre-SEO period to receive favorable corporate income results in the IPO or SEO year (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, JF 1998, JFE 1998). Moreover, firms choose to engage in deliberate net income deflation in the pre-share-repurchase year to receive favorable corporate income results in the post-repurchase period (Gong, Louis, and Sun, JF 2008). Share buyback can serve as a firm's response to temporary market overreaction to bad news such as stock analyst downgrades and pessimistic earnings forecasts (Peyer and Vermaelen, RFS 2009). Corporate incumbents time the stock market by repurchasing shares below the average relative stock price (Dittmar and Field, JFE 2015). Share repurchasers yield significantly positive Fama-French (JFE 1993) multi-factor alphas up to 36 months after the share buyback event.

In addition to temporary stock market undervaluation, there are several other reasons for corporate stock buyback. These reasons include:

(1) financial flexibility (Chen and Wang, JFE 2012; Bliss, Cheng, and Denis, JFE 2015);
(2) dividend-repurchase substitution (Grullon and Michaely, JF 2002; Leary and Michaely, RFS 2011; Michaely and Roberts, RFS 2011);
(3) accounting manipulation (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, JAE 2003; Gong, Louis, and Sun, JF 2008);

systematic risk adjustment (Grullon and Michaely, JF 2004); and
(4) peer mimicking behavior (Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen, JFE 2007; Babenko et al, JFQA 2012).

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Myers (JEP 2001) points out that capital structure theories are not designed to be general for testing them on a broad heterogeneous dataset to yield informative results. Fama and French (RFS 2002, JFE 2005) suggest that both the trade-off and pecking-order theories represent some elements of truth as stable mates in capital structure decisions. The lack of panel data on the leverage ratios of private firms severely restricts the econometrician's ability to deal with the dynamic versions of capital structure theories. This logic spans the studies by Fama and French (RFS 2002), Baker and Wurgler (JF 2002), Welch (JPE 2004), Flannery and Rangan (JFE 2006), Antoniou et al (JFQA 2008), and Huang and Ritter (JFQA 2009). This strand of capital structure literature specifies the dynamic tests and suggests a wide range of target adjustment speed estimates from 3 years to nearly 20 years. Specifically, Huang and Ritter (JFQA 2009) point out that target leverage is highly persistent through time (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, JF 2008; DeAngelo and Roll, JF 2015). This persistence requires the use of Hausman et al's (JE 2007) long-differencing panel estimator to address firm-specific unobservable heterogeneity in capital structure choice. This long-differencing panel estimator results in point estimates of partial adjustment toward target leverage of about 5 to 7 years. Huang and Ritter (JFQA 2009) discuss each econometric method in detail (e.g. Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions, mean-differencing panel regressions, dynamic GMM panel regressions, and long-differencing panel regressions).

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David Colander and Craig Freedman argue that the economic science went wrong when there was no classical liberal firewall between economic theories and policy reforms. Colander has long advanced the concept that the economic science must be neither positive nor normative. Alternatively, the economic science must involve the art of economic policy reforms. Here art requires vision and acumen in addition to knowledge and technique. Economists thus serve as economic policy engineers instead of natural scientists. Through the particular story of the Chicago school of economic thought, Colander and Freedman suggest that economic policy reforms can benefit substantially from neoliberalism (more art and less calculation). A thick history of the Chicago school of economic thought reminds us of the importance of inclusive institutions, not only for understanding the macro economy but also for thinking about how inclusive institutions affect our behavioral choices.

Neoliberal public choice continues to spin national taxation and several other forms of government intervention. The key post-crisis consensus focuses on government intervention as the primary root cause of socioeconomic malaise in several OECD countries. Ideology continues to inform public policy, and neoliberalism specifically advocates a minimal role for the state in economic affairs such as taxation, health care, trade, infrastructure, and immigration. Neoliberal public choice emphasizes regulatory failures rather than historical country-specific experiences.

The sheer predominance of utilitarian myopia reflects fundamental misconceptions about the proper role of government. Contrary to the post-crisis consensus, active strategic public-sector investment is critical to both economic revival and financial stability. The state should act as an investor of first resort, rather than a lender of last resort, for greater tech advances and revolutions in finance, energy, transport, medicine, and information communication. The government can learn much from the best business minds of Warren Buffett and George Soros in finance, Elon Musk in energy and autonomous transport, Peter Diamandis and James Brewer in health care and medicine, as well as Steve Jobs, Tim Cook, Bill Gates, Larry Page, and Jeff Bezos in information communication technology. Effective capitalism calls for both free market design and facilitative state involvement in economic governance and regulation.

Economists should borrow from all of the social sciences such as political science, sociology, law, finance, and management etc. Also, economists should blend hard knowledge with soft communication and qualitative judgment. With fresh insights, Colander and Freedman inspire many economists to seriously reflect on the nature of the economic science. The inevitable transformation of the economic science to a policy-driven discipline has cost us what Nobel Laureate James Buchanan called the soul of the economic science, i.e. a sense of prevalent history, literature, and philosophy. Adoption of the scientific method has often led to the common belief that economic theory can deliver useful practical knowledge. However, this belief overrides the limits of economic theory in a complex world where many people do not always behave as rational actors. These economic actors often face the myriad influences of culture, society, history, and government structure etc.

Colander and Freedman induce many economists to consider some fundamental questions. What do economists mean by classical liberalism? How does classical liberalism relate to the economic science? How can classical liberalism inform how we practice the economic science in both positive and normative views? Colander and Freedman argue that most economists should serve as policy engineers: they deploy expert knowledge with the socio-institutional ability to adjust many policies to different circumstances. These key economists should further act as benevolent social planners, impartial observers, and moral philosophers. For these reasons, most economists should strive to incorporate democratic processes into economic models and policy reforms.

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Nobel Laureate Paul Milgrom delves into the economic theory and market design of the U.S. incentive auction for wireless spectrum allocation from TV broadcasters to telecoms. Designing new markets with complex constraints requires both novel economic theory and real-word practice. This new market design often draws upon ideas from computer science and game theory. Milgrom teaches us how economic designers and auctioneers grapple with complexity both in theory and in practice. Specifically, the American Medical Association (AMA) has used a game-theoretic economic algorithm to fairly and efficiently allocate residents to hospitals. In some subsequent practical applications, many U.S. universities have applied the same algorithm to allocate college and graduate school applicants to particular programs (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth, 1984, 2008). Economic theory has also informed the adoption of optimal reserve prices in online advertisement auctions (Myerson, 1981; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011), as well as the eventual shift of ad auctions from practice-driven second price auctions (Aggarwal, Goel, and Motwani, 2006; Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz, 2007; Varian, 2009; Athey and Ellison, 2011) to Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction-driven mechanisms (Athey and Nekipelov, 2010; Varian and Harris, 2014).

Nowadays, many markets have become extraordinarily complex both in theory and in practice. For Lyft and Uber, for instance, each company has to figure out client destinations, fair prices, dynamic driver locations, and reserve prices for ride-share services. Each company needs to match drivers to customers with fair and efficient journey prices. Overall, each company must raise revenue to cover its costs in the hot pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization. Each company has to encourage drivers and riders to remain on the mobile ride-share platform. Most of economic theory treats simple models of the economy where prices alone can guide efficient economic decisions, but this conclusion rarely applies to complex price discovery systems (Milgrom, 2017, pp.44). Milgrom offers his main theoretical auction-driven innovations of both near substitutability and approximate equilibrium solutions. His account of the design of the incentive auction serves as a specific sort of parable for the design of complex markets (such as the reallocation of wireless spectrum licenses from U.S. TV broadcasters to telecoms).

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The U.S. bank oligarchy has become bigger, more profitable, and more resistant to public regulation after the global financial crisis.

Johnson and Kwak advocate that the U.S. bank oligarchy is too big to fail as the mega banks relentlessly continue to expand their political clout and economic influence in Wall Street and Washington. Without structural changes to the financial system, the U.S. may experience another main economic downturn that would be more severe than the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009.

Johnson and Kwak delve into the decades of U.S. regulatory history that precedes the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009. The U.S. has a long history of mistrusting large banks. Opponents of big banks include Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. went through significant financial deregulations. Banks were able to transform their fresh economic power into political clout in the 1990s. As of early-2010, the top 6 mega banks were U.S. national champions that might be viewed as too big to fail in terms of sheer size: Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Wells Fargo.

Johnson and Kwak propose a radical policy remedy to prevent the Global Financial Crisis. Breaking up big banks requires Congress to specify limits on bank size, and regulators should strictly enforce these size limits. Johnson and Kwak recommend size limits of about 4% of U.S. GDP for all banks and at least 2% of U.S. GDP for investment banks.

An alternative policy remedy would entail significantly raising capital requirements for big banks or systemically important financial institutions in the macro-prudential stress tests. Nobel Laureate Roger Myerson and Stanford finance professor Anat Admati and their co-authors indicate that the core capital ratio for U.S. large banks should increase to double digits in the reasonable range of 13%-25%. Some recent Federal Reserve research documents empirical evidence in support of this remedy. Either the U.S. regulators break up the big banks to reduce systemic risk exposure, or these regulators should require the mega banks to boost their core capital ratios for better financial market stabilization.

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The New Keynesian baseline model focuses on monetary policy interest rate rules in terms of primitive factors such as household consumption, capital accumulation, labor supply, economic output, national income, technical progress, and so forth. Like the DSGE models in the RBC school of economic thought, the New Keynesian baseline model evolves from first principles. Within this model, the core instrument of monetary policy is the short-term interest rate (the federal funds rate in America). The monetary policy design problem relates to how macro decision-makers mold the current paths and future expectations of interest rates in response to business cycle fluctuations (both output growth and inflation rates) in the general state of the real economy.

In the New Keynesian monetary policy framework, macro decision-makers derive gains from enhancing central bank credibility and communication. This credibility results from formal commitment to some Taylor-style interest rate rule via domestic institutional arrangements. In reality, no central bank can make any specific type of commitment over the future course of monetary policy. In the absence of nominal wage rigidities, the optimal monetary policy embeds some clear inflation target (e.g. a 2%-4% average inflation target). Specifically, the central bank gradually adjusts the short-term interest rate in order to smooth output and inflation fluctuations over time. In practice, the central bank should adjust the nominal short-run interest rate more than one-for-one with future inflation expectations. The central bank should adjust the nominal short-run interest rate sufficiently to shift the real interest rate in the same direction that offsets any movement in future inflation expectations. How the central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to output shocks often depends on the basic nature of these output shocks. In a nutshell, the central bank offsets demands shocks with interest rate hikes, but accommodates supply shocks with no major interest rate changes. This New Keynesian baseline monetary policy framework helps better balance the divine coincidence of both output and inflation stabilization in the form of zero or minimal quadratic welfare losses (Blanchard and Gali, 1997; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003; Blanchard and Gali, 2010; Gali, 2015).

If the central bank target for real economic output exceeds the market equilibrium level, an inefficiently high steady-state inflation rate may emerge in the absence of commitment. The welfare gain from commitment helps reduce this inflationary bias. In the New Keynesian monetary policy framework, there can be large welfare gains from commitment if the current price-wage formulation depends on future inflation expectations. The central bank chooses to commit to a credible low inflation target, and this central bank commitment can help improve the current trade-off between output and inflation. Specifically, this commitment can help reduce the welfare cost in terms of current output loss that the conservative macro decision-maker requires to reduce current inflation. A simple and feasible solution entails appointing some conservative central bank chair with a greater distaste for inflation than society as a whole (Rogoff, 1985). In practice, this hawkish monetary policy stance can help boost economic output and employment toward their maximum sustainable levels with low and steady intermediate inflation rates from quarter to quarter.

Modern central banks from the Federal Reserve System to European Central Bank and Bank of England downgrade the role of monetary aggregates (such as M2 and M3) in the practical implementation of monetary policy. The opportunistic approach boils down to trying to keep low and steady inflation, but allowing inflation to ratchet down in rare times of favorable supply shocks. The optimal monetary policy design depends on the degree of persistence in both output and inflation. The degree of output persistence is important because the future path of output gaps influences the market expectations of both inflation and the short-run interest rate. The degree of inflation persistence is critical because this factor governs the trade-off between output and inflation in both the current and future episodes. In the baseline model, output and inflation persistence arises from serial correlation in exogenous shocks. Most central banks commit to some Taylor-like robust interest rate rules, and these robust rules product desirable output and inflation outcomes in a broad variety of alternative macro economic frameworks. Empirical evidence suggests that the U.S. monetary policy follows the vast majority of New Keynesian interest rate principles (especially in the pre-Volcker episode). From Volcker and Greenspan to Bernanke, Yellen, and then Powell, U.S. monetary policy adopts some implicit low and steady inflation target of 2% to 4% in accordance with good policy management.

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Peter Isard analyzes the proper economic policy reforms and root causes of global financial crises of the 1990s and 2008-2009.

Peter Isard provides his prescient overview of empirical work on the past operation and reforms of the international monetary and financial system. Isard draws macro policy lessons from the global economic history of both exchange rates and capital flows (especially from the financial crises of the 1990s and 2008-2009). In light of the current international monetary and financial environment, Isard delves into the ongoing debate over the joint stewardship of both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In a fundamental view, financial crises and economic growth failures occur with unacceptable frequency. Isard analyzes what policymakers can accomplish in order to strengthen the global macro financial system. Isard further demystifies the IMF puzzle by addressing the central criticisms of IMF activities in recent decades. Financial globalization can be a sustainable engine of economic growth. At the same time, financial globalization may inadvertently cause financial fragility in the global network of capital flows. Isard thus focuses on the core capital markets and policies, exchange rates, private investment decisions, and regulatory agencies. These inclusive institutions help shape the current account balances and capital flows. The IMF supports different flexible exchange rate regimes, monetary policy systems, capital flows, and financial crisis resolution paths.

As a former senior advisor at the IMF, Isard provides his macro economic insights into exchange rate regimes, capital flows, and macrofinancial crises. Many modern macro models can help predict exchange rate fluctuations over long time horizons. Isard attributes several financial crises of the 1990s and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 to persistent exchange rate misalignments, substantial fiscal budget and current account deficits, weak bank systems, and unsustainable national debt burdens. Sometimes financial crises turn out to be both chaotic and unpredictable black swan rare events due to self-reinforcing prophecies, beliefs, and preferences. International monetary and financial reforms can take much time and cross-country coordination and collaboration. There are many different ways for economists and politicians to skin the cat, and all roads eventually lead to Rome. However, no one can build Rome in one day.

This blog article further includes prescient economic insights into the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 from Nobel Laureates George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, Harvard macrofinance professors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, Nobel Laureate and Columbia macrofinance professor Joseph Stiglitz, former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson, and former IMF research directors and Indian central bank governor Raghuram Rajan. 

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