The global pandemic crisis helps reshape international finance, trade, and technology.

In recent times, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that the fiscal-debt-to-GDP ratio of most rich economies would rise from 95% in 2018 to 135% by 2022. This public debt burden has fostered fresh financial activism. Central bank balance sheets have ballooned substantially as most central banks create trillions of dollars to soak up government debt. Also, the European Union now issues public debt at scale for the first time to pay for its recovery fund. Many macro economists regard unconventional post-crisis policies such as large-scale asset purchases of about a decade ago as radical at the time. Nevertheless, these policies now look paltry by comparison amid the recent rampant corona virus crisis of 2020-2021.

The recent decline in U.S. unemployment suggests that the worst of the pandemic virus crisis has been mercifully brief. As Covid-19 continues to spread worldwide, America and Australia have been through at least 2 rounds with the corona virus; Britain, France, and Spain brace for a second wave; both China and India are on an upward slope; and no one knows for sure how pervasive Covid-19 has been in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Several economies have to operate around the public health constraints of social distance with face masks and ventilators in the next few years.

The current pandemic outbreak helps strengthen fundamental forces and factors that exacerbate the recent welfare costs on the world economy. The corona virus crisis further helps accelerate structural changes in trade, finance, and technology. The pre-pandemic global economic conditions arise from 3 emergent trends of the modern new century. First, the big countries with substantial population dividends (Brazil, Russia, India, and China or BRIC) continue to integrate with the world trade system. Second, the world economy continues to recover from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 in light of both subprime mortgage turmoil and sovereign debt accumulation. Third, high-tech disruptive innovators from Facebook and Google to Apple and Amazon start to attract antitrust scrutiny with new rules and regulations in the modern digital economy. As Chinese workers leave rural poverty for factories on the east coast, cost-effective goods flow west and financial assets flow east. In combination, these macro trends help create low inflation rates, low interest rates, and fewer lower-skill manufacturing jobs in several rich countries such as America, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan etc. Several years after the Great Recession and Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, both inflation and interest rates remain low as central banks and national treasuries launch fresh large-scale quantitative-easing asset purchases and fiscal stimulus programs. As many tech titans such as Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Nvidia, and Tesla (FAMGANT) reap the cash rewards of both network effects and platform monopolies, new technology causes a decline in product market competition with superb corporate profitability. The law of inadvertent consequences counsels caution when push comes to shove from time to time.

The corona pandemic outbreak represents another worldwide shock. The subpar aggregate demand is even worse than the economic malaise right after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009. Low and even negative interest rates are more likely to last in the next few years. This low interest rate trend helps prop up asset prices even though most economies are fundamentally fragile. Multinational corporations start to recognize the imminent risks of weak global supply chains. Key consumers and online influencers quicken the switch from physical retail trade to e-commerce. Many consumers learn to acquire their health care and education services online. Covid-19 helps accelerate the dual disruptive transformation of digital information technology.

The share prices of many tech titans have soared since the first wave of the corona virus crisis. Nasdaq tech stocks produce an impressive annual return of about 55% during this interim episode. High-skill tech workers now adapt to remote work-from-home arrangements with remarkable speed. This tech trend steps up investments in remote work technological advances such as Zoom and Skype video conference calls. In this positive light, the corona virus crisis marks a major watershed moment in both high-tech transformation and disruption.

The world emerges from 2020 into an era of more intense tech power competition. Covid-19 airborne transmission worldwide coincides with both trade conflicts and geopolitical risks between China and America. With their peculiar focus on bilateral trade deficits and soybean purchases, Sino-American trade disputes are now part of a broader battle. America lobbies several allies to reject Chinese 5G technology, ramps up regulatory scrutiny of foreign investors, and imposes economic sanctions to restrict Chinese access to the U.S. semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley. In recent times, the U.S. government forces one of the most successful apps, TikTok, to sell its North American operations. Both China and the U.S. now try to diversify away from each other in trade and technology. It is too hard to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies due to their seamless integration of global supply chains. In recent years, however, these powerful countries now combine closer economic ties with pervasive mutual suspicion.

For domestic politics in many rich countries, the global pandemic outbreak poses a challenge to the status quo. Unlike the Global Financial Crisis, this time big banks, insurers, credit card companies, and other financial service providers play a lesser role this time. When we juxtapose the weak global economy with high asset prices and high unemployment rates among low-skill workers, the uneven redistributive effects of both fiscal stimulus programs and low interest rates provoke public anger. Moreover, low interest rates plausibly prolong and exacerbate the fiscal deficits in many rich countries such as America, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and other European countries. Near-zero interest rates seem to neuter most monetary policy decisions as central banks and national treasuries coordinate the macro efforts to cope with post-pandemic recessions. Large-scale asset purchases, cash transfers, and even negative interest rates collectively help rewrite the social contract in the post-crisis decades of (de)globalization. Global populism can often prove to be the root cause of structural economic reforms in health care, education, infrastructure, immigration, trade, finance, and technology.

 

The global corona virus crisis helps reshape international trade and technology.

Covid-19 causes substantial economic damage to the global supply chains for cars and consumer electronics etc. China is the second-biggest global exporter of parts and components. As many mainland factories shut down, manufacturers now face delays and bottlenecks everywhere throughout the global supply chains. In light of this problem, the World Economic Forum suggests that multinational corporations bring modular production closer to their end users and customers.

Global supply chains help move modular production to several countries with lower labor costs such as China, India, and Vietnam. This worldwide trend has been real and persistent since the mid-1980s. As a result, cross-border trade and commerce surge substantially in volume. Global trade grows twice as fast as world economic output. During this interim transition, several East Asian economies such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore manage to integrate with the new world economy. Specifically, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan produce high-speed and high-quality semiconductors to the global market for consumer electronics such as smart phones and tablets. Since its official membership as part of the World Trade Organization back in 2001, China boosts its share of world exports of many parts and capital goods from about 7% to 35%+. Perhaps millions of Americans, Britons, and Europeans lose their low-skill jobs to this East Asian supply chain competition. On balance, international trade continues to rise as a greater share of global GDP. From the late-1990s to 2020, foreign direct investment continues to flow into these East Asian tech service providers in cars, consumer electronics, semiconductors, computers, hardware parts and components, and many more.

Just-in-time delivery of both parts and components works well with closer upstream suppliers. Rare disasters from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 to the new corona virus global pandemic outbreak of 2020-2021 highlight the risks and threats of high specialization in the tech-driven global supply chains. Several multinational manufacturers start to view long supply chains as weak, fragile, and even unwieldy. Trade begins to concentrate in only a few regional blocks. Globalization becomes slowbalization.

As American tariffs on Chinese imports increase from 9% to 25% in recent years, the U.S. share of Chinese trade has fallen to its lowest level within almost 30 years. America circumvents and so sabotages the World Trade Organization by stopping the nomination of judges to the appeal board that helps adjudicate trade disputes. In Europe, Britain votes for Brexit as affirmative work in progress. Many European leaders now feel frustration with free and open global markets. Both American and European economies wish to develop their own national champions in both trade and technology to better compete with Chinese state enterprises and tech titans.

A recent McKinsey survey shows that almost 95% of multinational manufacturers plan to further strengthen the resilience of their global supply chains. In fact, these multinational corporations start to diversify their own cross-border operations away from China and America. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam thus become natural substitutes. Many multinational corporations worry about not only Sino-U.S. trade conflicts, but also their international carbon emissions, labor standards, and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risks and threats.

Through the global pandemic crisis, key politicians have come to realize how much public health care systems depend on cross-border trade. Imminent shortages of personal protective gears such as face masks and ventilators spur some regulators to block exports of both these gears and similar medical goods. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) counts at least 120 new export restrictions in 2020-2021. In this broader context, the IMF predicts some continual export bans and restrictions as the corona virus vaccines, test kits, and medications become available in mass production by early-2021. The IMF further forecasts that the sharp decline in cross-border trade must be commensurate with the sudden slump in aggregate demand from the recent pandemic recession. In the worst-case scenario, international trade can substantially shrink by 25% to 35% in 2021-2022.

In accordance with some recent empirical evidence, about a quarter of the decline in U.S. GDP transmits through global supply chains. Reshoring production would not have reduced this collateral damage. Many multinational manufacturers must find quick workarounds to trade off a bit of efficiency for greater resilience. Instead of a wholesale break from the Sino-U.S. phase one trade deal, Covid-19 can cause an acceleration of fundamental forces that have already been in motion over some recent years. Meanwhile, most governments strive to shorten global supply chains for medical equipment. America and China tend to trade under a darker cloud of mutual suspicion to better balance commercial and geopolitical interests.

 

New labor market trends emerge from the technological transition to remote work.

The global pandemic crisis disrupts many labor markets worldwide. This disruption helps improve remote work conditions and global supply chains. This development accords with the main theme of a recent book by Nassim Nicholas Taleb that many antifragile mechanisms become better after some major disruption. Labor market mechanisms that help exploit some specific prior competitive advantages tend to persist (unless rare disasters sweep away these antifragile market mechanisms). Also, recessions typically bring on Schumpeterian creative destruction of low-skill jobs. For instance, American firms that experience severe financial crises strive to restructure their production toward greater use of technology, so these firms leave a persistent mark on labor market mechanisms even after unemployment returns to the new normal steady state. Over the long run, economic growth concentrates in vibrant and successful cities such as London, New York, San Francisco, Sydney, and Tokyo. The central explanation relates to the positive agglomeration effects of pulling together knowledge workers and high-skill tech teams. Productive contacts and interactions among people grow exponentially with scale economies, network effects, and information cascades in key locations.

Covid-19 seems to shift the business landscape in a new way that portends further product market concentration. Greater dependence on technology is not the only mechanism at play. Through another market mechanism, the corona downturn kills off small startups that cannot weather the global pandemic shock. In contrast, tech titans and mega banks benefit from the liquidity backstops that many governments provide in the form of fiscal and monetary stimulus to global capital markets. As of early-2021, America has distributed at least 5 million paycheck protection program loans (for comparison, there are about 6 million small-to-medium enterprises with fewer than 500 employees in the whole country). The corona virus crisis hits hard some particular industries such as food and beverage trade, air transport, tourism, and other retail commerce. By comparison, the technology sector promotes smart team collaboration with remote work arrangements. High-skill knowledge workers can split their work hours between solitary work at home and team collaboration in the office.

This structural shift can cause irreversible changes in global labor markets. Many low-skill jobs vanish even when most global labor markets return to pre-pandemic steady states. Several industries adjust with less capital investment in tech clusters and financial centers. Some public corporations invest more in online collaboration with flexible work-from-home arrangements in the suburbs. The current pandemic crisis can cause negative ripple effects on the poor and low-skill service workers. Specifically, the current corona recession exacerbates the unequal distribution of both income and wealth between home owners versus renters, dividend capitalists versus wage earners, and high-skill professional managers versus low-skill service workers. Pandemic outbreaks aggravate economic inequality.

 

The global pandemic crisis can leave a long legacy of low interest rates with higher asset prices.

In response to the global pandemic crisis, the Federal Reserve reduces the interest rate to the zero lower bound and then provides a torrent of liquidity through large-scale asset purchases (QE or quantitative easing monetary policies). This liquidity sustains U.S. dollar money markets, prevents a massive credit crunch, and helps curtail mass lay-offs and corporate bankruptcies. The U.S. Treasury provides fiscal stimulus and paycheck protection programs to better coordinate with these radical monetary policies of both near-zero interest rates and quantitative asset purchases. Several other central banks and national treasuries follow suit. From early-2020 to 2021, American, British, European, and Japanese central banks print new money with total worth of almost $4 trillion worldwide. This pervasive money creation helps keep long-term government bond yields close to zero. In this broader context, U.S. asset prices for stocks and corporate bonds remain high.

The current divergence between U.S. capital markets and the real economy marks the apotheosis of mega trends in the past decade. One of these mega trends leads central banks to print new money in order to buy subpar corporate bonds. This key liquidity can help sustain several corporations that might otherwise be on the brink of insolvency. Also, monetary stimulus exacerbates income and wealth inequality and then extends home ownership beyond the reach of young renters even amid weak economic growth. Another mega trend relates to the side-effects of monetary stimulus such as low inflation expectations and negative real output distortions. In combination, these side-effects contribute to lower asset returns. In recent years, many macro economists attribute these lower asset returns to general declines in the natural rate of interest from the 1960s to present.

In the current pandemic period, many households and companies prefer to hoard cash due to precautionary concerns. Several macro economists view the swollen bank balances of consumers as potential fuel for an inflationary boom. The corona virus crisis provides further evidence in support of the thesis that rare disaster risk explains the U.S. equity premium puzzle (i.e. the average stock return exceeds the risk-free rate by at least 6%, and it is almost impossible for economists to reconcile this high equity premium with the low covariance of consumption growth with stock return performance unless the marginal investor exhibits extreme aversion to risk). Since the 1980s, more than 20% of the decline in the natural rate of interest results from widespread income inequality. The corona virus crisis can compound this key socioeconomic problem in many rich economies such as America, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and Singapore.

The IMF and World Bank forecast that safe asset supply can decrease in the next 5 years to only one quarter of world output (against at least 40% before the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009). In this broader context, the world economy appears to resemble Japan where even decades of deficits as well as 150% net public debt burdens still cannot break the low-inflation low-interest-rate equilibrium. For many rich countries in North America and Europe, secular stagnation becomes the new normal steady state.

Low interest rates make it easier for politicians to pay for all kinds of demands on public finance. Key economic priorities include health care, education, residential property protection, infrastructure, and social security etc. In the next few decades, governments become dependent on the twin macro instruments of both fiscal and monetary stimulus programs. In the current global business cycle, many countries may inadvertently become vulnerable to subsequent interest rate liftoff.

As interest rates remain low in the foreseeable future, many central banks lack the conventional monetary policy tool to tame boom-bust fluctuations. Specifically, it is no longer possible for the Federal Reserve to reduce interest rates and inter-bank reserves in order to revive real output and employment. The Federal Reserve can permit inflation to overshoot the 2% target during the current recovery only if fiscal stimulus brings about more inflationary conditions. Meanwhile, the IMF forecasts of 150%+ public-debt-to-GDP ratios call for some fiscal discipline.

 

The global pandemic crisis helps sharpen the capitalist role of the democratic state rule of law.

Without the corona virus crisis, the biggest macro structural changes (i.e. financial turmoil, technological progress, and the economic rise of China) would not lead to any further fiscal and monetary policy reforms. The democratic state plays a vitally important capitalist role with sound rule of law. In the meantime, governments must reconsider not only higher productivity gains and economic growth rates, but also the socially optimal redistribution of both income and wealth via cash transfers and tax credits etc. The resultant fiscal and monetary policy strategies should promote reasonable reforms amid substantial economic uncertainty in the post-crisis period. Both financial and pandemic crises help hone facilitative government intervention over time.

In many countries, older voters are nostalgic for a global economy that can never return to the new normal steady state. Young people feel frustration due to declines in social mobility and asset return stabilization. Many experts now fear the adverse effects of both climate change and environmental degradation on global economic growth and development in the next few decades. Almost everyone laments both income and wealth inequality in the modern new century. Covid-19 further widens this economic wedge between rich-world corporate decision-makers and low-skill service workers.

The current corona virus crisis seems to hasten new transformative changes in the global economy. As economic inequality rises, asset prices boom, urban service-sector jobs shrink, tech titans dominate specific market niches, and governments turn to expansionary fiscal and monetary stimulus programs. The political climate may become too toxic to better balance the gradual polarization between economic nationalism and naïve millennial socialism.

Greater international trade and automation can often help improve macroeconomic conditions worldwide. A future of online services promises higher productivity gains, and politicians should choose to lift some regulatory obstacles with proper antitrust scrutiny over time. Both health care and education are ripe for more tech disruption by cross-border service providers. Most governments should be active to serve as insurers of last resort for better household income distribution. These governments should further attempt to facilitate another global employment boom and economic recovery. In the long run, income distribution depends more on structural reforms and fundamental factors than business cycle fluctuations.

 

Technological advances, geopolitical risks, and pandemic outbreaks cannot shake investor confidence in the American dollar as the global reserve currency.

U.S. dollar strength often negatively correlates with the general state of the global economy. This empirical fact reflects the unique international role of the American dollar. As the global economy continues to suffer from the new pandemic recession, the demand for safer assets such as U.S. Treasury bills and bonds rises over time. These capital inflows can result in American dollar appreciation. On the other hand, the domestic dollar can often reflect the relative performance of U.S. asset markets. By comparison, the international dollar tends to react to global developments such as overall global GDP growth, investor sentiment, asset market stabilization, and commodity price parity.

On balance, many macro economists expect to see an interim period of American dollar depreciation in the next few quarters due to several fundamental forces and factors. First, the current prevalent dollar exchange rate shows about 10% to 15% overvaluation. It is likely for the American dollar to depreciate sustainably at least 11%-14% on the broad basis of cross-border trade. Second, the Federal Reserve commits to keeping near-zero or subpar interest rates in the next few years. To the extent that the subsequent interest rate liftoff starts to cause higher inflation, dollar depreciation seems more likely in the next few quarters. Third, the global economy should be on a relatively steep upward trajectory out of the corona virus recession. In combination, these fundamental factors (cf. dollar overvaluation, post-pandemic recovery, and near-zero or low interest rates etc) can contribute to persistent dollar depreciation in the foreseeable future.

In the context of Sino-U.S. relations, a more multilateral approach to foreign policy can further strengthen the recent appreciation of the Chinese renminbi against the American dollar. Under the Biden administration, the Democrat proposal for higher corporate income tax rates and tech regulations can curtail cross-border demand for U.S. stocks. Also, even fiscal stimulus can paradoxically lead to American dollar depreciation. If most investors seek compensation to buy more U.S. Treasury bills and bonds for fiscal deficit plans (as the Federal Reserve continues to keep near-zero or low interest rates), the U.S. dollar should further weaken to attract greater foreign demand for U.S. stocks, bonds, and other tradable assets.

The current U.S. economy represents only 15% to 20% of global GDP in absolute terms, but the American dollar accounts for almost 65% of global foreign exchange reserves, and 75% of cross-border loans to Asian and European new markets. In practice, the American dollar continues to be the dominant currency of global trade. U.S. extraterritorial economic sanctions can potentially threaten both the financial and monetary sovereignty of the European Union, Britain, China, and Russia etc. It can take years for Brexit and Chinese Belt-Road efforts to affect global currency choices. Stronger competition from the euro and Chinese renminbi is likely to be a necessary condition for substantially reducing American dollar dominance.

In assessing the next likely shift toward the uses of central bank digital currencies (CBDC) or private cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, key economists find it useful to draw a distinction between 2 primary functions of fiat money or legal tender. First, fiat money represents a common store of value. Second, fiat money serves as a medium of exchange to facilitate mutual transactions. CBDCs address the transactional uses of fiat money, so these CBDCs can help facilitate a strategic move away from the American dollar in some of these uses. At this stage, however, CBDCs and private cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum etc cannot shift the demand for American dollar reserves. Neither can these alternative currencies challenge the U.S. dollar as a pervasive store of value. In the special case of most cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, sudden or substantial fluctuations in relative prices against the greenback beg the question whether Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are only transient asset bubbles in a fundamental sense. With its exorbitant privilege, the U.S. dollar can continue to dominate in most cross-border transactions. American dollar dominance empowers the Federal Reserve to serve as an effective lender of last resort. In this fundamental sense, the American dollar remains the solo global reserve currency as an effective medium of exchange and further a vital store of value in most international trade and cross-border commerce. Whether the euro and Chinese renminbi can catch up with the greenback remains an open controversy. 

 

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